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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AT WORK: LAW, POLITICS, AND ETHICS. By
Bron Raymond Taylor. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
1991. Pp. xvii, 251. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $14.95.

Few would disagree that affirmative action is one of the most controversial and hotly debated issues of our time. As with other issues
that inflame the passions to a high degree, many people have firmly
held opinions on affirmative action deeply rooted in what they consider to be inviolable principles. In Affirmative Action at Work, Bron
Taylor 1 seeks to identify the moral and ethical principles upon which
those on all sides of the debate rest their convictions. In so doing,
Taylor sorts through the complicated and often contradictory arguments advanced by opponents and proponents of affirmative action
alike.
The framework for Taylor's analysis is the quantitative and qualitative data compiled during a study of the affirmative action program
implemented by the California State Department of Parks and Recreation. In his study, Taylor interviewed and sent questionnaires to people at all levels of the Parks Department's hierarchy, asking them to
respond to a variety of questions regarding affirmative action generally
and the department's affirmative action program specifically. Taylor
uses this information to categorize and critique the commonly advanced arguments, and he attempts to discern why different groups of
people view affirmative action differently.
Taylor's book has a different focus from the spate of recent books
that argue for or against affirmative action on legal or moral grounds. 2
Instead of persuading the reader to take a particular position on affirmative action, Taylor's purpose is to examine the debate itself. For .
Taylor, the affirmative action controversy presents in sharp relief the
conflict between social justice and individual rights and thus "provides
an appropriate window through which to examine moral meaning in
our culture" (p. 10). Further, because affirmative action has been employed in a culture adhering to philosophical liberalism,3 it necessarily
1. Assistant Professor of Religion and Social Ethics, University of Wisconsin.
2. See, e.g., HERMAN BELZ, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED: A QUARTER CENTURY OF AF·
FIRMATIVE ACTION (1991) (reviewed in this issue by Professor Robert A. Sedler. - Ed.); STE·
PHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991); SHELBY STEELE,
THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA (1990); MELVIN I.
UROFSKY, A CoNFLICT OF RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1991)
(reviewed in this issue by Professor Robert A. Sedler. - Ed.); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: THE DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1991) (reviewed in this
issue by Professor Robin West. - Ed.).
3. Taylor defines liberalism as "[t]he enlightenment philosophy that is the dominant social
philosophy in the United States. Its key tenets are shared by political liberals, conservatives, and
libertarians. These tenets include: rights inhere to the individual; people are self-interested, acquisitive, maximizing consumers ••.•" Pp. 235-36.
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tests the legitimacy of one of liberalism's central tenets: that jobs and
benefits in a society of equal opportunity should be distributed on the
basis of talent and merit - which Taylor refers to as the merit principle (pp. 7-9). To Taylor, then, the affirmative action debate reduces to
a referendum on the larger issue of whether the merit principle is an
appropriate foundation for our system of distributive justice.
In Part I of his book, Taylor provides the legal background to affirmative action. Though not a lawyer, Taylor does an impressive job
of succinctly and accurately summarizing the relevant statutes and
case law. 4 Next, Taylor conducts a brief review of several major
schools of ethical thought and sets forth some basic terminology used
by ethical theorists.
In Chapter Two, Taylor launches into a rather esoteric ethical
analysis of the various conceptualizations of the affirmative action issue. According to Taylor, ethical analyses of affirmative action fall
into four basic categories: ''justice as freedom, justice as fairness, justice as productive freedom, and justice as the greatest good" (p. 37).
For each category, Taylor first reviews the ethical theory of one of its
chief proponents, and then applies a contemporary version of the approach to the affirmative action controversy.
Taylor argues that viewing justice as freedom, as libertarians and
conservatives generally do, causes one to reject preferential5 affirmative action because it impinges upon individual autonomy (p. 56). In
contrast, a conception of justice as fairness, according to Taylor, leads
one to conclude that affirmative action is morally required to counteract the disadvantages of not being a white male (p. 57). It is upon this
view of justice as fairness, Taylor asserts, that contemporary liberal
support of affirmative action rests. A third theory of justice focuses on
productive freedom and reflects Marxist notions of distributive fairness. Because liberal equal opportunity is not considered desirable according to Marxist principles, Taylor argues, it is unclear whether
such a conception of justice would sustain the use of affirmative action
programs (p. 69). Equally ambiguous is whether a consequentialist
view of justice, which analyzes policies in terms of their overall contribution to the good of society, would endorse affirmative action. According to Taylor, a determination whether affirmative action
contributes to the overall good is inherently subjective, depending on
4. Taylor concludes his review of the relevant case law by predicting that, in light of the
current conservative makeup of the Supreme Court and the logic of recent cases, "preferential,
goal-type affirmative action will be further narrowed by judicial rulings but will remain a permissible remedy for specific cases of demonstrable discrimination." P. 33. However, Taylor does
not provide the reader with the specific basis for his prediction.
5. Taylor distinguishes between "protective" affirmative action, in which there is strict enforcement of antidiscrimination laws but no consideration of race or gender in hiring decisions,
and "preferential" affirmative action, in which preference is given to individuals who are members of historically subjugated groups. Pp. 12-13.
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which of many consequences are considered desirable and the relative
values that people assign to them (pp. 69-70).
Part II of Affirmative Action at Work reviews Taylor's empirical
research, which consisted of studying the attitudes of employees in the
California State Department of Parks and Recreation toward affirmative action. 6 At the outset of Part II, Taylor sets forth four major
purposes of his research and analysis. His first objective was to determine whether and to what extent the various subgroups affected by
affirmative action - white men, white women, nonwhite men, and
nonwhite women - view affirmative action from different moral and
ethical perspectives. Second, Taylor sought to test his prediction that,
based on self-interest, white men tend to oppose affirmative action
while others generally support it. The third focus of inquiry was to
determine whether the ethical and moral underpinnings of various attitudes toward affirmative action "reinforce or challenge the modes of
economic distribution that accompany a Liberal market society" (p.
76). In particular, Taylor wanted to know whether different socioeconomic groups bring different ethical norms to the affirmative action
debate and whether such norms comport with or challenge our liberal
market society's notion of distributive justice - that preferred jobs
and salaries should be distributed on the basis of merit (pp. 76-77).
Last of all, Taylor's research sought to determine the extent to which a
person's sense of individualism influences his or her opinion of affirmative action, and more specifically, whether white men eschew groupsensitive approaches to social policies more than women and nonwhite
men (p. 78).
Next, Taylor summarizes the results of his qualitative research,
which consisted of about fifty confidential interviews with Parks Department employees. Taylor asked the employees specific questions
about affirmative action as well as open-ended questions aimed at determining whether the respondents rested their views on any particular moral principle. During his interviews, Taylor observed
considerable hostility toward affirmative action, much of it from white
males who felt that their careers had been irreparably damaged by the
department's program (pp. 90-91). Also, the interviews revealed that
there was a great deal of fear surrounding the issue of affirmative action. Not only was there fear among white men that affirmative action
would ruin their careers, but there was also fear, despite Taylor's as6. The department's affirmative action program, in existence since 1975, aims at increasing
the number of women and nonwhite men employed by the agency. However, since the pro·
gram's inception there has been a continuing debate over the purpose of the program. Some
within the department argue that the program is intended to ensure that all applicants receive
equal consideration by eliminating racial and gender bias from the selection process. Others
contend that the program is aimed at increasing the number of women and nonwhites, and thus
applicants from these groups should be hired if they are qualified, even if not necessarily the
"best qualified" with regard to traditional credentials. Pp. 88-90.
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surances of confidentiality, that expressing one's true feelings about
affirmative action would invite reprisals by those on the other side of
the issue or by the department itself {pp. 92-93).
In addition, Taylor notes tJ;iat there was significant discomfort and
confusion when respondents were asked to discuss the moral values
most important to them. According to Taylor, "[q]uite often, long
pauses suggested that a respondent rarely if ever reflected on his or her
moral values" {p. 98). Moreover, between five and ten percent of
those interviewed were ambivalent when asked about the legitimacy of
affirmative action - although most respondents did have strong feelings for or against affirmative action {p. 99).
On the basis of the personal interviews, Taylor forge8 some tentative explanations of why people feel as they do about affirmative action. Taylor observed that staunch opponents of affirmative action
typically adhered strongly to the merit principle and other ethical
norms in which concern for individual autonomy is paramount. People strongly opposed to affirmative action commonly objected that affirmative action is essentially reverse discrimination against whites,
that people should be hired solely on the basis of merit, and that past
discrimination does not justify sacrifices by white males who are not
personally responsible for past injustices. From the interviews, Taylor
concludes that the more importance someone places on the principle
of individualism, the less likely he or she is to support affirmative action and other group-conscious remedies {p. 111).
Taylor also finds that those less firm in their opposition, but nonetheless against affirmative action, generally were so because of pragmatic concerns about its consequences {pp. 103-05). Common
concerns along these lines were that affirmative action leads to inefficiency by reducing the quality of employees and that such programs
are not really needed, either because discrimination is no longer a
problem or that the remedy, preferences based on race and gender, is
worse than the problem itself. Taylor notes that supporters of affirmative action generally expressed the same individualistic principles as
did its opponents but that they tempered such feelings with concern
for society as a whole {pp. 107, 111). Finally, people who strongly
supported affirmative action, Taylor concludes, did so because they
gave "their group or society as whole a clear and strong priority over
the individual" {p. 111).
Curiously, Taylor's discussion of the moral and ethical considerations underlying various views of affirmative action makes no mention
of racial animus or adherence to negative racial or gender stereotypes.
For Taylor, a person's position on affirmative action is largely determined by the extent to which he or she adopts the principle of individualism. While this may have been true for some of the more
thoughtful employees, there is little doubt that at least in some in-
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stances, other, less charitable forces were at work. Surely, among
those most strongly opposed to affirmative action, some (but by no
means all) felt the way they did out of unabashed hostility toward
nonwhites and women. A little less obvious is the likelihood that
many people who justified their strong opposition to affirmative action
by relying on the merit principle may have done so on the basis of a
conscious or unconscious belief that nonwhites and women are innately less competent than white men. 7 If one subscribes, whether intentionally or not, to these traditional notions of inferiority, affirmative
action programs by definition result in better-qualified white males being denied job,s. Regrettably, in his discussion of the interviews with
Parks Department employees, Taylor fails to mention racism and sexism as potential factors in the debate over affirmative action. 8
In the next two chapters, Taylor summarizes and analyzes quantitative data gathered from questionnaires completed by roughly five
hundred employees at the Parks Department. As in the interviews,
the respondents were asked a broad range of questions regarding affirmative action and the problems it presents. According to Taylor,
[t]he most striking finding shown in this chapter is that while there was
significant agreement among all groups that affirmative action is morally
right, this consensus quickly broke down when affirmative action was
discussed with greater specificity. When explicitly preferential types of
affirmative action policies were mentioned, support dropped, and
dropped most among white men. [p. 133]

Unfortunately, many of Taylor's other findings are less provocative,
and thus make for less interesting reading. For example, the survey
responses confirmed that nonwhites and women feel more strongly
than white men that prejudice is commonplace in our society, that
liberals favor affirmative action more than conservatives, and that a
greater percentage of women and nonwhites approve of group-oriented policy approaches than do white males.
The book's last chapter begins with a discussion of the four principal theoretical questions the research sought to address. First, Taylor
concludes that the prevalent attitudes on affirmative action do indeed
reflect the various approaches taken by social philosophers (p. 184).
Second, as expected, the research confirms that historically oppressed
groups approach the issue of affirmative action from a different ethical
perspective than white males. In his study, Taylor found that non7. For an excellent discussion of unconscious race prejudice, see Charles R. Lawrence III,
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV.

317 (1987).
8. In an effort to determine whether and to what extent a person held racist or sexist atti·
tudes, Taylor might have asked a person being interviewed for his or her opinion as to why
women and nonwhite men have not, on average, achieved at the same level as white men.
Although people rarely admit - to themselves or others - to having racist and sexist beliefs,
such a question might have shed considerable light on the extent to which a person subscribed to
negative stereotypes of women and nonwhites.
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whites and women "are more likely than white men to evaluate principles of distributive justice, or policies such as affirmative action, by
emphasizing the impact on their group or upon the overall social
good" (p. 185). Third, while class, political ideology, job level, age,
and religion influence a person's view of affirmative action, the principal determinant is whether the person is a member of a traditionally
subjugated· group (p. 185). Fourth, Taylor concludes that because
"[m]ost respondents did not demonstrate any significant critical distance from the dominant norms of distribution in the Liberal culture,"
the debate over affirmative action will not have a significant impact on
the ethical and moral direction of our society (p. 185).
Finally, Taylor evaluates the legitimacy of the common arguments
for and against affirmative action in terms of the level of acceptance
among those interviewed and surveyed. According to Taylor, the
common libertarian and conservative arguments against affirmative
action lack support in his data (p. 188). For example, the libertarian
argument that regardless of its purpose, any use of racial classifications
threatens fundamental rights received little support among Taylor's
respondents. While recognizing that popular support or rejection of a
particular argument is not a litmus test for moral righteousness, Taylor argues that "[t]hose who experience an aggressive affirmative action program :firsthand are well placed to offer testimony as to the
actual effects of the policy - and few conclude it violates fundamental
rights" (p. 189). In addition, Taylor concludes that a common conservative argument against affirmative action - that it violates the
merit principle - persuades few people. Despite strong support in
theory for the notion that preferred jobs and salaries should be based
solely on merit, Taylor finds that when given specific examples, most
people do not endorse a rigid application of the merit principle and
that it "is not the decisive standpoint from which most people evaluate
affirmative action" (p. 190).
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Taylor finds that a frequently
advanced argument in support of affirmative action - that it is needed
to compensate for past injustices to racial minorities and women had scant support among those participating in his research. 9 Overall,
Taylor observes, few people found compensatory justifications for affirmative action persuasive (pp. 176-77). Nonetheless, Taylor concludes that "[w]hen illuminated by [the] data, the arguments of
liberals fare better than the arguments of libertarians and conservatives" (p. 190). For example, people generally agreed that discrimination is prevalent in the workplace, and they believed that the Parks
9. As with the "fundamental rights" issue, Taylor's finding that the people surveyed do not
support this argument is not conclusive proof that it is invalid. It may well be that most people
do not understand the cause-and-effect relationship between past discrimination and present conditions and thus may not appreciate fully why compensation may be justified.
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Department's affirmative action program was needed to ensure that
nonwhites and women received fair consideration. 10
Moreover, according to Taylor, the real-world consequences of affirmative action, often a source of considerable disagreement between
supporters and opponents of affirmative action, on balance, appeared
more positive than negative (p. 192). Specifically, Taylor finds that
most people agreed that women and nonwhite men would not get serious consideration for jobs without an affirmative action policy, that
most people did not feel that affirmative action programs exacerbated
existing tensions by dividing people along race and gender lines, and
that few felt that affirmative action had resulted in unqualified people
being hired and promoted (p. 194). Unfortunately, however, in the
book's final chapter Taylor does not buttress his conclusions with specific data - a sharp contrast from the rest of the book - thus affording those in philosophical disagreement with his :findings a convenient
means of dismissing his assessment of the affirmative action
controversy.
In sum, Affirmative Action at Work provides an excellent introduction to the legal and ethical issues that comprise the current debate
over the legitimacy of affirmative action programs. Moreover, the
book affords the reader a r~e insight into how members of the work
force who, on a daily basis, see and feel the impact of affirmative action view the issue. The reader who is well-acquainted with the affirmative action controversy may find Taylor's review of his research
unremarkable and little more than confirmation of intuitive perceptions of the affirmative action debate. Taylor's research may also be
criticized for failing to consider the impact of racial and gender bias on
how people view affirmative action. Overall, however, Taylor does an
impressive job of sorting through the myriad arguments for and
against affirmative action and discussing in a succinct and comprehensible manner the competing ethical and moral principles implicated in
this highly charged debate.
-

Michael K. Ross

10. P. 192. Taylor writes:
Most respondents saw discrimination as prevalent in society and in their workplace. Only
white men were inconsistent on this point. They admitted to the existence of discrimination
but did not think it was prevalent or affected chances within their own organizations. On
this issue, where large majorities of nonwhites and women assert that prejudice was prevalent both in society and in their own workplace, I would submit that these traditionally
excluded individuals are better situated than white men to evaluate the prevalence of
discrimination.
P. 192.

